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Zusammenfassung 
Jüngere Forschungsarbeiten haben eine globale „Explosion“ der Demokratie identifiziert, die 
eine scharf eingegrenzte Periode innerhalb Huntingtons breiterer Definition der Dritten 
Demokratisierungswelle bildet. Mit Blick auf diese hervorstechende Demokratisierungsphase 
ist die Rolle von Modernisierungsfaktoren bisher noch nicht untersucht worden. Ausgehend 
davon, dass Modernisierung ökonomische und kulturelle Aspekte hat, prüfen wir zwei promi-
nente Thesen. Zunächst testen wir Przeworski/Limongis Behauptung, dass Regimewechsel 
zur Demokratie nicht von ökonomischer Modernisierung befördert werden. Unter Verwen-
dung eines kontinuierlichen Maßes für Regimewechsel kommen wir zu einem gegenteiligen 
Ergebnis. Zum zweiten testen wir Ingleharts Befund, dass moderne Einstellungen der Bürger 
ebenfalls keine positive Wirkung auf Regimewechsel zur Demokratie hätten. Im Gegensatz 
auch zu diesem Befund kommen wir zu dem Ergebnis, dass ein wesentlicher Aspekt 
kultureller Modernisierung, nämlich die Verbreitung von Freiheitsansprüchen, sehr wohl 
einen positiven Effekt auf Regimewechsel zur Demokratie hat – mehr noch sogar als 
ökonomische Modernisierung. Zum dritten entfalten wir das Konzept der Humanentwicklung, 
um ein generelleres Verständnis der Wirkungszusammenhänge im Modernisierungs-Demo-
kratisierungs-Nexus zu etablieren. Unsere Daten decken 60 Gesellschaften aus den 
Weltwertestudien ab, auf die fast 50 Prozent aller Regimewechsel entfallen, die seit 1972 
weltweit aufgetreten sind. 
Abstract 
Recently scholars identified a global “explosion” of democracy as a sharply distinctive period 
within Huntington’s Third Wave of democratization. So far the role of modernization has not 
been analyzed with particular regard to this outstanding phase of democratization. Given that 
modernization has economic as well as cultural aspects, we test two prominent theses. First, 
we test Przeworski/Limongi’s claim that transitions to democracy do not derive from eco-
nomic modernization. Using a graded measure of regime change, we present evidence to the 
contrary. Second, we test Inglehart’s finding that modern mass attitudes play a negligable role 
in promoting regime change to democracy. To the contrary again, we show that one aspect of 
cultural modernization, mass-level liberty aspirations, has a positive impact on democratic 
change– even stronger than economic modernization. Third, we unfold the concept of Human 
Development to establish a more general argument on the causal mechanism in the moderni-
zation-democratization nexus. Our data cover 60 societies of the World Values Surveys, rep-
resenting nearly 50 per cent of all regime changes in the world since 1972. 
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Introduction 
In recent articles Kurzman and Dorenspleet have shown that Huntington’s original periodi-
zation of the “Third Wave” of democratization needs to be corrected (Kurzman 1998; 
Doorenspleet 2000; Huntington 1991: 21-26). Although Huntington dates the beginning of 
the Third Wave to the mid 1970s, neither Kurzman nor Doorenspleet find evidence of an 
unusual increase in the proportion of the world’s democracies before the late 1980s. 
Instead, a sharply distinctive “explosion of democratization” occurred within a narrow time 
span from the late 1980s to the early 1990s (Doorenspleet 2000: 399): more than 70 per 
cent of the shifts toward democracy that Huntington calls “The Third Wave” occurred in 
this much shorter period. 
So far, the role of modernization has not been analyzed with particular regard to this dis-
tinctive phase of democratization. Among recent studies of the modernization-democrati-
zation linkage only few authors explicitly analyze changes to democracy instead of levels 
of democracy (Muller and Seligson 1994; Inglehart 1997: 160-215; Przeworski and 
Limongi 1997). As we will demonstrate, even these few authors operate with an 
inappropriate time frame, so that the most significant regime changes between 1985 and 
1995 slip through their net. Thus, the claims of modernization theory have not been 
examined for their most outstanding test case. It is still an open question whether 
modernization theory does apply to the global “explosion of democracy.” To give an 
answer to this question is the purpose of this article. 
Modernization refers to naturally evolving processes in economic structure and political 
culture. Typically, these processes are continuous, incremental, and path dependent, pro-
ducing persistent developmental differences between nations (Inglehart and Baker 2000). 
Democratization, on the other hand, is a process that occurs rapidly, in distinct waves that 
sweep across many nations (Huntington 1991: 13-30; Modelski and Perry 1991; Jaggers 
and Gurr 1995; Kurzman 1998; Doorenspleet 2000). While it takes decades for nations to 
move from low to high levels of modernization, they can leap literally overnight from 
autocracy to democracy. Abruptness is one profound characteristic of democratization 
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waves. Another one is that they follow major changes on the international scene, especially 
shifts of regime alliances (Siverson and Starr 1994). 
Abruptness and shifting regime alliances limit the extent to which modernization can 
explain transitions to democracy. Modernization is an endogenous and long-term charac-
teristic of societies which can not explain the suddenness and the internationality of 
democratization waves. Modernization as such does not create the situations that favor 
international waves of democratization. Historically, these situations resulted from shifts of 
regime alliances when autocratic empires, such as those of Germany and Japan, were 
defeated and dissolved in Word War II. The recent “explosion of democracy,” too, was 
preceded by a shift of regime alliances. In the 1970s western powers still supported many 
autocratic regimes, such as that of Marcos in the Philippines or Noriega in Panama. Not 
until the early 1980s did this policy began to change. The US and the EU provided finan-
cial support for democratic movements in authoritarian states, and the World Bank began 
to tie credits to conditions of “good governance” (Robinson 1991; Randall and Theobald 
1998: 242-244). Western-oriented autocracies lost international support from the mid 
1980s onwards. Communist autocracies suffered from a similar loss, though this happened 
in a much more incisive way when Gorbachev nullified the Brezhnev doctrine in 1987. 
These changes in both East and West reduced international support for autocracies, helping 
trigger the global “explosion of democracy” from 1985 to 1995. 
Yet, shifts of regime alliances are only part of the explanation. The end of the Brezhnev 
doctrine helps explain why communism broke suddenly down in societies that have once 
been under Soviet control. But the end of the Brezhnev doctrine does not account for the 
huge variations in changes to democracy, ranging from the small improvements in Belarus 
to the large ones in Poland. The international factor does not make modernization irrele-
vant. Instead, the international setting opens windows of opportunity through which mod-
ernization can operate. Modernization can be blocked from having an impact on political 
regimes by external support of autocracy. But once that support is withdrawn, the gate is 
open. Then, cross-national differences in modernization—which seemed to be irrelevant 
for decades—may suddenly become consequential in creating corresponding variations in 
changes to democracy. This poses the question: “To what extent do persistent variations in 
modernization levels explain sudden variations of regime changes?” This is what moderni-
zation could explain. Whether it does will be analyzed in this article. 
We begin with a discussion why recent findings about the role of modernization in tran-
sitions to democracy are inconclusive. On the basis of this critique we unfold an argument 
why mass-level liberty aspirations, as an indicator cultural modernization, are the most 
powerful predictor of transitions to democracy. This claim is tested in subsequent sections, 
controlling for numerous factors which are considered as important in the democratization 
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literature. The effect remains robust against all kinds of control. We then demonstrate that 
liberty aspirations do not depend on prior democratic experience. This invalidates the 
counter-argument of a reverse causation between liberty aspirations and democracy. 
Liberty aspirations do not simply reflect experience with democracy; they derive primarily 
from economic modernization. Finally, we discuss our findings within the broader 
theoretical framework of Human Development. This leads to a more general understanding 
of the causal mechanisms in the modernization-democratization linkage. 
1 Recent Findings on the Modernization-Democratization Linkage 
Research on the relation between modernization and democratization has a long tradition.1 
Most studies in this field define modernization as economic development, using various 
indicators linked with economic growth, rising education and communication and increas-
ing social diversification. Many analyses have shown a robust positive relation between 
economic development and levels of democracy. Following the Marxian notion that regime 
institutions reflect socioeconomic structures, the prevailing causal interpretation of these 
correlations is that democracy results from economic development rather than the reverse 
(Helliwell 1994; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Barro 1997: 63-87). 
Few empirical studies, however, deal explicitly with transitions to democracy. Most 
studies analyze levels of democracy at a given time or the number of years under democ-
ratic rule, leaving it uncertain whether modernization only sustains existing democracies, 
or whether modernization also promotes the rise of new democracies. Recognizing this 
question, Przeworski and Limongi (1997) make an important contribution by explicitly 
analyzing the emergence of democracies (and autocracies, respectively). They use a 
dichotomous regime measure to estimate the probability that a regime switches from 
autocracy to democracy, or the reverse. They conclude that modernization helps account 
for the survival of existing democracies, but not the emergence of democracies from 
autocracies. 
Though this finding has attained wide prominence, it is dubious in several respects. First 
and foremost, it seems to rest on a misinterpretation of Przeworski/Limongi’s own data. 
The authors draw their conclusion from the finding that, in the period since 1950, the prob-
ability of autocracies shifting to democracy does not increase with higher levels of eco-
                                                 
 1  Among many others, following studies all show strong relationships between socioeconomic develop-
ment and democracy: Lipset 1959; Cutright 1963; Olsen 1968; Bollen 1983; Diamond 1992; Huber, 
Rueschemeyer, and Stephens 1993; Lipset, Kyoung-Ryung, and Torres 1993; Barro 1997; Vanhanen 
1997; Gasiorowski and Power 1998. 
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nomic development. But this is only half of the story. The first column of their Table 2 
shows that the probability of shifts in the opposite does also not increase with rising 
income levels. Instead, the probability of democracies to switch to autocracy decreases 
steeply when income levels grow (Przeworski and Limongi 1997: 162). Thus, the crucial 
question concerns the probability balance of switches to democracy and autocracy: how 
large is the probability of switches to democracy compared with switches to autocracy as 
income levels rise? One can easily calculate from Przeworski/Limongi’s figures that this 
ratio changes monotonically in favor of switches to democracy with rising income levels: 
in very poor countries (below $1,000), autocracies are only one tenth as likely to switch to 
democracy as democracies to autocracy; while in very rich countries (above $7,000) 
autocracies are 28 times likelier to switch to democracy than democracies to autocracy. 
This is demonstrated by the following ratios, calculated from Przeworski and Limongi’s 
table: 
 
Per capita income Probability of autocracies switching to democracya divided by 
probability of democracies switching to autocracyb 
Below $1,000 0.10 
$1,001-2,000 0.24 
$2,001-3,000 0.64 
$3,001-4,000 1.50 
$4,001-5,000 3.13 
$5,001-6,000 6.25 
$6,001-7,000 11.75 
Over $7,000 28.33 
a PAD in Table 2 of Przeworski and Limongi 1997: 162. 
b PDA op. cit. 
 
There is growing preponderance of transitions to democracy over the opposite with rising 
income levels. Przeworski/Limongi’s conclusion that transitions to democracy occur ran-
domly is obviously flawed, even in view of their own data. 
A second problem in Przeworski and Limongi’s analysis is that they use a dichotomous 
measure of democracy. They assume that democracy reflects some minimal criterion, such 
as holding free elections: with it, democracy is present; without it, there is autocracy. But 
this is an over simplification, since most contemporary regimes fall into a gray area 
between maximum democracy and autocracy. A society’s location on this continuum can-
not be captured by a dichotomous measure. Even among regimes that would count as 
democracies by some minimal criteria, there are substantial differences in important 
aspects, such as freedom of the press, fairness of elections and the extent of human rights. 
Though a democracy by some minimal criteria, India does not perform as well as Japan in 
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these aspects. Conversely, regimes that might be labeled autocracies because they do not 
hold free elections, show substantial differences in their repressiveness. Even during the 
PRI hegemony, Mexico was not as repressive as China is today. Such differences can only 
be captured by graded measures of democratic performance. 
Przeworski and Limongi’s methodological argument for using a dichotomous measure is 
similarly unconvincing. They argue that dichotomous measures have a smaller error vari-
ance than graded measures. This is true but the crucial question is how large the error vari-
ance is in relation to the total variance. Graded measures show a larger error variance but a 
larger total variance as well, so the ratio between these variances is not necessarily worse 
in graded measures. Quite the contrary, Elkins’ analysis indicates that graded measures 
tend to have a better “nomological validity” (Elkins 2000). 
Third, Przeworski and Limongi completely neglect the cultural dimension of moderni-
zation. This is a serious shortcoming in their account of modernization. From Lipset 
onward, it has been argued that economic modernization has a positive impact on 
democracy because it leads to changes in mass attitudes that undermine autocracy and 
foster democracy (Lipset 1959). Often described as “civic culture” (Almond and Verba 
1963) or “cultural modernity” (Inkeles 1983), modern attitudes include tolerance, general-
ized trust, ideological moderation, subjective well-being, and an emphasis on individual 
self-expression (Inglehart and Baker 2000). Cultural modernization seems to be the inter-
vening variable between economic modernization and democracy (Huntington 1991: 69). 
Logically this should be true. Democratization is a product of collective action, and collec-
tive action is guided by collective preferences that are embedded in political cultures 
(Eckstein 1988). The impact of economic modernization on democratization, therefore, 
should operate through its impact on cultural modernization. 
Surprisingly at first glance, empirical evidence supporting this thesis is scarce. Analyz-
ing 24 societies from the first World Values Survey, Muller and Seligson found little evi-
dence that modern mass attitudes promoted shifts toward democracy from 1972-80 to 
1981-90 (Muller and Seligson 1994). Similarly, Inglehart’s analyses of 43 societies from 
the second World Values Survey found that subjective well-being and interpersonal trust 
were conducive to high levels of democracy, but had no significant effect on changes 
toward democracy from 1990 to 1995 (Inglehart 1997: 181, Table 6.1). 
These findings seem to contradict modernization theory. We will demonstrate, however, 
that these findings are inconclusive because of misspecifications of the dependent and 
independent variables. 
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2 The Dependent Variable: Democratization 
Both Muller/Seligson and Inglehart use the sum of the civil liberties and political rights 
scores from Freedom House as a measure for the level of democracy over a given period. 
Regime change is then operationalized by comparing the levels at two different periods. 
The first problem with both analyses is based on the timing of the change measure. 
Muller and Seligson attempt to analyze change in democracy levels by regressing 
democracy levels averaged over 1981-1990 on the average democracy levels in 1972-1980. 
But the difference in democracy levels between these periods represents the historic course 
of democratic transitions inadequately. The vast majority of the world’s new democracies 
experienced the most significant regime changes in the period between 1985 and 1995. 
Muller/Seligson’s analysis, however, groups the first half of the transition period (1985-90) 
together with another period (1981-85) during which most of the new democracies were 
autocratic, averaging out the most significant changes. Even worse, Muller/Seligson’s 
analysis completely skips the second half of the transition period (1990-95). Consider 
Chile’s Freedom House scores: the most salient feature of recent Chilean history is the 
rapid rise in democratic performance from an extremely low level in 1987 to a very high 
level in 1990. How is this represented in Muller/Seligson’s measure? Comparing Chile’s 
democracy level during 1972-80 with that in 1981-90 reveals little change. The rise in 
democratic performance from 1987-90 is averaged with the poor performance of the late 
Pinochet-period; while the early Pinochet-period is offset by the much better democratic 
performance before Allende’s death. Mixed together this way, some of the most crucial 
regime changes in the late twentieth century are buried. The choice of time periods is cru-
cial, and should take the important Third Wave into account; Muller and Seligson’s choice 
of periods seems completely arbitrary. 
Inglehart avoids averaging democracy scores over long periods of time. He creates a 
change variable by calculating the difference in democracy levels between 1995 and 1990. 
This time frame, also, ignores the first half of the major transition period (1985-90). The 
dramatic changes in the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Chile are obscured by this 
measure. 
Moreover, Inglehart’s analysis does not control for the different levels of democracy at 
which given societies enter the period of change. This is a serious problem, since a soci-
ety’s entry-level of democracy limits the possible range of change toward more democ-
racy. Societies that are already close to the maximum on democratic performance, have no 
chance of substantial improvement. Even if the presence of a modernized culture were the 
sole cause of democratization, it would be perfectly possible to find a negative correlation 
between cultural modernization and rising levels of democracy: the societies with the most 
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modernized cultures would show the smallest change toward democracy—since they 
adopted high levels of democracy already earlier. To conclude that cultural modernization 
is detrimental to democratization would be a serious misinterpretation in this case. 
Another methodological problem is that most authors who use the Freedom House 
scores for civil liberties and political rights simply add them up, producing an average of 
the two measures. It is more effective, however, to use the product of these scores, rather 
than the sum. This is true because many countries have shown substantially more 
improvement in their scores on political rights, than in their scores on civil liberties. The 
proportion of the world’s countries with the highest scores (6 or 7) on the political rights 
scale increased from 24 to 46 per cent between 1972 and 1998, while the corresponding 
group in the civil liberties scale increased only from 23 to 33 per cent.2 This phenomenon 
is apparent in the upper plot in Figure 1. This figure shows the number of countries that 
moved at least two points upwards on the Freedom House scales, minus the number that 
moved downwards, for each year since 1972. The results are shown separately for political 
rights and civil liberties. Scores above zero indicate how many more countries moved 
upwards than downwards. As is evident, the trends for political rights and civil liberties do 
not necessarily coincide. Especially in the major transition phase, the gains for civil liber-
ties are substantially lower than those for political rights. 
If civil liberties and political rights interact to produce democracy, one should not allow 
high scores on one to compensate for low scores on the other. We avoid this by using their 
products. Doing otherwise, obscures the difference between merely “electoral” and genu-
ine “liberal” democracies (Diamond 1993). Some dubious democracies, such as Peru under 
Fujimori, show an embellished performance when we use the average instead of the prod-
uct score: These countries perform fairly well on political rights but not on civil liberties. 
Averaging these discrepancies out, ignores the fact that limitations on civil liberties may 
render political rights ineffective. In this way, authoritarian structures can be consolidated 
beneath a surface of electoral competition. 
The product of the civil and political rights scores is more strongly associated with theo-
retically relevant correlates of democracy than is their average. Our measure of cultural 
modernization (see section 3.3) predicts 53 per cent of the variance in the countries’ 
democratic performance in 1995-99 as measured by the product of the Freedom House 
scores; using the average of these scores, it predicts only 44 per cent. Using the product of 
the Freedom House scores follows the methodological advice of Zeller and Carmines to 
                                                 
 2 We reversed the Freedom House scores so that 1 indicates the lowest and 7 the highest level on the 
scales for political rights and civil liberties. The percentages mentioned above refer to the universe of all 
states scored by Freedom House. See Appendix for scale construction and data sources. 
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operate with the indicator having the better “nomological validity” (Zeller and Carmines 
1980). 
 
Figure 1: The Global “Explosion” of Democracy  
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The upper plot in Figure 1 shows that the major wave of regime transitions occurred during 
the period from 1985 to 1995. Hence, our measure of REGIME change is based on the 
difference between each country’s multiplied Freedom House scores in 1995 and 1985.3 
Since the product of the scores for political rights and civil liberties ranges from 1 to 49, 
the difference between two products can have values from -48 to +48, with the magnitude 
indicating the range of change and the sign indicating its direction (negative in case of 
losses, positive in case of gains in democratic performance). In some cases we calculated 
this measure using other years than 1985 and 1995, in order to capture individual 
countries’ sustained change rather than short-term shifts that did not endure. Measuring 
Russia’s democratic gains from 1985 to 1995 would be misleading unless we recognize 
that she lost substantial parts of that gain after 1995: Russia’s sustained achievement in 
democratic performance is better represented by the difference between 1999 and 1985. 
Conversely, we would underestimate Taiwan’s democratic gain if we ignored that her 
upward move continued to 1997. To identify each country’s most significant period of 
change we inspected plots of the multiplied Freedom House scores for each year since 
1980.4 
Using slightly adjusted time frames does not cause methodological problems because we 
are not attempting to predict the precise time of regime change. We take the occurrence of 
change as given, and attempt to predict its range. Knowing that a regime change occurred 
at some time between 1980 and 1999, the question is how far given nations moved towards 
(or away from) democracy during that period. We do not bother whether certain nations 
democratized earlier or later. Our concern is the range of nations’ durable gains or losses in 
democracy. All of the changes analyzed here occurred between 1980 and 1999, with the 
great majority between 1985 and 1995. 
We identified three entry-types of regimes, based on the levels of democratic perform-
ance that were present before change. Countries scoring 9 or lower on the Freedom House 
product scale were classified as “entry-autocracies.”5 This category includes 34 countries 
(the timing of change shown in parentheses; if none is indicated, it was 1985-95): Albania 
(1985-98), Armenia, Azerbaijan (1985-97), Bangladesh, Belarus (1985-96), Bosnia-
Herzegovina (1985-96), Bulgaria (1985-96), Chile, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, East Germany, Georgia (1985-97), Ghana (1985-97), Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
                                                 
 3 Data drawn from Freedom House’s Internet page: “http:\\www.freedomhouse.org.” Methods and 
indicators described there. 
 4 On request we deliver these plots to the interested reader. 
 5 Ranging from 1 to 7, the scales for civil liberties and political rights are divided by the neutral value 4 
into an autocratic side (values below 4) and a democratic side (above 4). The highest value on the 
autocratic side is 3 so that 9 (3 x 3) is the upper limit for autocracies on the product scale. Conversely, 
the lowest value on the democratic side is 5 so that 25 (5 x 5) is the lower limit for democracies on the 
product scale. 
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Macedonia (1985-98), Moldova (1985-98), Nigeria (1985-99), Pakistan (1984-99), Philip-
pines (1983-96), Poland, Romania, Russia (1985-99), Slovakia (1985-99), Slovenia, South 
Africa (1985-95), South Korea, Taiwan (1985-96), Ukraine, Uruguay (1980-95), Yugosla-
via (1985-99). 
Countries scoring above 9 and below 25 are classified as “entry-hybrids.” Mexico is the 
only case in this category. 
Finally, countries scoring 25 or above in 1985 are categorized as “entry-democracies.” 
They include 28 countries: Argentina (1986-95), Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil (1986-
97), Canada, Denmark, Dominican Republic (1985-98), Finland, France, West Germany, 
Iceland, India (1980-95), Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru 
(1988-97), Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey (1987-96), UK, USA, Vene-
zuela. 
Because we need data on cultural modernization, we can not analyze all existing nations. 
We are restricted to the sample of 61 societies covered by the second and third World Val-
ues Surveys.6 This sample allows one to draw general conclusions because it reflects the 
global pattern of transitions to democracy, as is demonstrated by the lower plot in Figure 1: 
the World Values Survey sample moves on almost exactly the same trajectory as the uni-
verse of all nations, although the average democracy score in the WVS sample is consis-
tently larger than in the universe. This reflects a sampling bias: old democracies, which 
existed before the transition wave, and new democracies, which emerged during this wave, 
are over-represented. The over-supply of new democracies reflects an over-representation 
of former communist societies in the sample. But this peculiarity makes the sample even 
more suited to test modernization theory. Of course, communist regimes broke down partly 
because of their economic inefficiency—an inefficiency which kept modernization levels 
lower than they would have been with market economies. But inefficiency did not equalize 
the levels of economic modernization among communist societies. These societies have 
shown sizeable long-term differences in levels of industrialization, tertiarization, urbaniza-
tion, communication, education, and per capita income, ranging from less developed 
countries, like Romania, to highly developed ones, such as the Czech Republic. One would 
expect to find similar differences in cultural modernization because cultural modernization 
is usually linked with economic modernization. Accordingly, Huntington concluded that: 
“In terms of cultural tradition, economic development and social structure, Czechoslovakia 
would certainly be a democracy today (and probably Hungary and Poland also) if it were 
not for the overriding veto of the Soviet presence” (Huntington 1984: 211). 
                                                 
 6 Information on sampling, questionnaire and access to data can be obtained from the World Values Study 
Group’s Internet page: “http://wvs.isr.umich.edu.” 
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Without the collapse of Soviet imperialism no wave of democratization would have 
swept across Eastern Europe in 1989. This is evident but does not invalidate modernization 
theory. The point is the same here as with economic inefficiency. The experience of for-
eign imperialism, economic inefficiency and authoritarian rule are constants, typical to 
more or less the same degree for all ex-communist societies. These societies provide an 
ideal arena in which to test modernization theory, allowing one to study the impact of 
modernization, holding these factors constant. 
Former communist societies are by no means the only new democracies in our sample, 
however. It includes a number of others, such as Chile, the Philippines, South Africa, 
South Korea, and Taiwan, making it possible to examine the post-communist societies in 
context with societies of profoundly different historical and cultural background, and to 
test whether our findings apply to post-communist countries alone. 
3 The Predictors of Democratization: Economic and Cultural Modernization 
3.1 Economic Modernization 
In the modernization literature, the most widely-used indicator of socio-economic devel-
opment is per capita GDP. Other regularly used indicators include measures of mass com-
munication and mass education as well as the size of the service sector, or “tertiarization.” 
Composite indicators that summarize several aspects of economic modernization are rarely 
used. This is surprising, since economic modernization is a multifaceted phenomenon, and 
these facets may interact to bring about democracy. Some societies, such as the oil export-
ing countries, show exceptionally high figures for per capita GDP but rank low on other 
aspects, such as mass education. They would show intermediate rankings on a combined 
modernization indicator—which is more in keeping with their poor democratic perform-
ance than their GDP levels would suggest. Similarly, some post communist countries, such 
as Bulgaria, show anomalously high education levels, suggesting a higher democratic per-
formance than one would expect from per capita GDP. These examples suggest that com-
bined measures of economic modernization may be better predictors of shifts toward 
democracy than any single measure. Two combined indicators of economic modernization 
are available: the human development index provided by the United Nations Development 
Program and an index of resource distribution developed by Vanhanen (see Appendix for 
data sources and scale construction).  
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3.2 Cultural Modernization 
There is little consensus on which indicators best measure cultural modernization. Indeed, 
one reason why neither Muller/Seligson nor Inglehart could prove that cultural moderniza-
tion promotes transitions to democracy stems from the choice of the cultural variables. 
Inglehart used generalized trust, life satisfaction, and personal happiness (Inglehart 1997), 
while Muller and Seligson use these indicators plus a measure of political moderation. No 
doubt, these are modern civic cultural attitudes. But it is hardly surprising that these atti-
tudes have little to do with transitions to democracy. We do not question that generalized 
trust, political moderation, and life satisfaction foster the functioning of already existing 
democracies, as Inglehart argues.7 But why should high levels of satisfaction, trust, and 
moderation tend to turn autocracies into democracies? The strengthening of autocracy 
would be a more plausible consequence. 
In keeping with modernization theory, we shall consider attitudes linked with economic 
modernization. These attitudes should be capable of emerging in any type of regime type—
otherwise, these attitudes could not emerge within autocracies, causing the emergence of 
new democracies. Finally, these attitudes should be inherently related to democracy—oth-
erwise there is no reason to expect that an increase in them would give rise to mass 
demands for democracy. 
To find the attitudes that satisfy these requirements, one must identify the focal principle 
of the modernization process as a whole; only then we can seek this principle’s equivalent 
in the sphere of political culture. For this purpose, we propose an interpretation of mod-
ernization based on the principle of Human Development. Sen introduced the idea of 
Human Development, but we will develop this concept more systematically in section 7, 
introducing it only briefly here (Sen 1997). 
3.3 Liberty Aspirations 
Following Sen, we view Human Development as the enlargement of people’s capabilities 
and opportunities to base their lives on their own choices. Accordingly, the underlying 
theme of modernization in all its related aspects is individual empowerment. This holds 
true of economic modernization, which gives people growing physical and cognitive 
resources through rising incomes, education, and information. Democratization is another 
aspect of individual empowerment, most obvious in its emphasis on freedom rights. If eco-
                                                 
 7 At this point Inglehart follows Putnam 1993. 
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nomic development and democratization contribute to individual empowerment in the 
material and institutional spheres of society, what is their equivalent in the cultural sphere? 
Culture is the domain of mass aspirations, demands, and motivations. Thus, if individual 
empowerment occurs in the cultural sphere, it would be reflected in a motivational mobili-
zation of the public, leading to more ambitious mass aspirations. We argue that LIBERTY 
aspirations, or demands for personal freedom for self- and co-determination, represent 
precisely such ambitious aspirations. Hence, individual empowerment in mass motivations 
(and thus in political culture) is present in proportion to the spread of liberty aspirations in 
societies. 
Rising liberty aspirations represent the aspect of cultural modernization for which we are 
searching. We hypothesize that: (1) liberty aspirations become more intense and wide-
spread with economic modernization; (2) they do so in both democratic and non-democ-
ratic regimes; and (3) they translate into mass demands for democracy, since this is the 
type of regime that provides the broadest opportunities to satisfy liberty aspirations.8 (4) 
Controlling for a society’s initial level of democracy, liberty aspirations have a significant 
positive impact on transitions to democracy whenever external “gate-blockers” are 
removed. 
So far no one, not even Inglehart, has examined the impact of liberty aspirations, 
although this seems perfectly consistent with his general theory of postmaterialist value 
change. Indeed, three of the six items he uses to measure postmaterialist values focus 
explicitly on demands for liberties. In keeping with our theoretical framework, we 
hypothesize that these liberty aspirations should have a stronger impact on transitions 
toward democracy than any of his other items—indeed, they should have a stronger impact 
than any other pro-democratic attitude. The postmaterialism battery is organized into three 
four-item groups, each of which offers the respondents a choice between two materialist 
and two postmaterialist items. Three of the six postmaterialist items address political or 
civil liberties: “giving people more say in important government decisions,” “protecting 
freedom of speech,” and “seeing that people have more say about how things are done at 
their jobs and in their communities.” Respondents can give each item top, second, or no 
priority. Depending on how the respondents ranked these items, we scored their liberty 
aspirations on a six-point index, with 0 indicating the lowest and 5 the highest level of 
liberty aspirations. When calculating averages across groups, this ordinal index becomes a 
continuous scale. We use the national means as indicators of given societies’ mass levels 
                                                 
 8 The accumulation of liberty aspirations must overcome certain collective action hurdles in order to 
promote democratic change. Such hurdles may be high, especially when an external power supports 
autocracy. But when these hurdles are removed, it becomes likely that liberty aspirations will translate 
into groups and actions that seek democracy, with the success of democracy rising in proportion to the 
strength of liberty aspirations among mass publics. 
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of liberty aspirations. Liberty aspirations vary within societies, but the responses in each 
survey show single-peaked distributions that are centered on the median. Thus, national 
averages reflect the societies’ central tendencies in liberty aspirations.9 
Liberty aspirations differ from postmaterialism in both concept and measurement. Post-
materialism combines aspirations for civil and political liberties, together with aspirations 
for ecological, aesthetic and ethical quality of life. These two types of aspirations can be 
treated as one concept—postmaterialism—when dealing with cultural change in general. 
But when focusing on democratization, one should differentiate between liberty aspirations 
and other aspirations. Giving top priority to the ecological, aesthetic, and ethical quality of 
life is an aspiration that may emerge in postindustrial societies, while liberty aspirations 
can evolve considerably earlier. To anticipate one of our findings, the relation between 
mass levels of liberty aspirations and a nation’s democratic performance in 1995-99 shows 
a .72 Pearson correlation (N = 60). By contrast, the quality of life aspirations show a cor-
relation of only .30 with democratic performance. Thus, the distinction between the two 
components of postmaterialism is both theoretically and empirically meaningful.10 
In 41 of our 61 societies we measured liberty aspirations using the second World Values 
Survey conducted in 1990-91. Assuming that transitions to democracy depend on liberty 
aspirations present during that change, the 1990-91 measure of liberty aspirations is per-
fectly suitable. This measure is located at the midpoint of the major transition period from 
1985 to 1995. In another 20 societies, the measure of liberty aspirations is only available 
from the third WVS conducted in 1995-98. Using this measure is not ideal but not neces-
sarily problematic. Cross-national differences in liberty aspirations are very stable over 
short periods of time, such as the approximately five year period between the second and 
third WVS. In the 30 cases for which both measures are available, the correlation in liberty 
aspirations between the second and third waves is .90: a given country’s liberty aspirations 
in 1995-97 closely reflect its liberty aspirations in 1990-91. Consequently, we use one 
pooled measure of liberty aspirations for all 60 nations in our sample. 
The upper plot in Figure 2 reveals that liberty aspirations do indeed explain much of the 
variation in transitions toward or away from democracy. In case of “entry-autocracies” lib-
erty aspirations explain 65 per cent of the gains in democratic performance (60% including  
 
                                                 
 9 We admit that national aggregates of survey data sometimes obscure large between-group variances 
within nations. However, this does not mean that national aggregates of survey data are meaningless 
measures that have no impact on structural societal features, such as democracy. As we will show, such 
an impact does exist. 
10 Liberty aspirations include one item (“seeing that people have more say about how things are done at 
their jobs and in their communities”) that is not included in the short version of postmaterialism. 
Dropping this item from the index of liberty aspirations, the correlation with democratic performance in 
1995-99 falls to .62. 
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Figure 2: The Impact of Liberty Aspirations on Democratic Change and of Economic 
Development on Liberty Aspirations 
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Belarus and Croatia);11 while among “entry-democracies,” liberty aspirations explain 59 
per cent of their resistance against losses of democratic performance (50% including 
Finland, India and Portugal). Moreover, cross-national differences in liberty aspirations 
can themselves be explained by variations in economic modernization. This is shown in the 
lower plot where the x-axis indicates cross-national variation of economic resource distri-
bution (see Appendix for a description of this index). 
These findings are clearly in line with our hypotheses. Bivariate evidence, however, is 
insufficient to validate our argument. It is necessary to control for the effects of other vari-
ables that have been prominently discussed as correlates of democracy. We will use these 
variables as control predictors in regression analyses. 
4 Alternative Predictors of Democratization 
Alternative predictors, together with our major predictors, are listed in Table 1. A detailed 
description of scale construction is given in the Appendix. We tried to include all predic-
tors to which the literature assigns a significant role in promoting democracy. We refer 
only briefly to the reasons why these indicators are assumed to be linked with democ-
racy.12 The predictors can be differentiated into three groups: socio-structural, political 
cultural and a third group that reflects the international environment. 
The socio-structural predictors include several indicators of economic modernization: 
PROSPERITY (per capita GDP), EDUCATION (years of full time education, tertiary enroll-
ment), TERTIARIZATION (service sector share), and two composite indicators: the HUMAN 
development index and the Vanhanen-index of ECONOMIC resource distribution. Control 
predictors that may counterbalance the impact of economic modernization are cleavage 
indicators: INCOME equality (income share of poorest quintile, income ratio of poorest to 
richest quintile), ETHNIC polarity (percentage second largest ethnic group), LINGUISTIC 
fractionalization, and RELIGIOUS fractionalization. These predictors are often assumed to 
be detrimental to democracy. The next group of predictors indicates religious traditions. A 
number of authors have argued that PROTESTANTISM (percentage protestants) or WESTERN 
Cultural heritage (percentage protestants plus Catholics) is conducive to democracy, while 
ISLAM (percentage Muslims) is not. Finally, it has been claimed that relatively high STATE 
capacity (tax revenue, government consumption) is crucial to well-functioning democracy. 
                                                 
11 Belarus and Croatia, together with the countries along the chain from Pakistan to the Philippines in 
Figure 1 (upper plot), show less impact of liberty aspirations on democratic change. These societies’ 
liberty aspirations show larger intra-national variance than most other countries. 
12 For more detailed arguments concerning nearly all of these predictors see Dahl 1993: chapter 5. 
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By contrast, MILITARISM (soldiers per inhabitants, share of military expenditure) has been 
considered detrimental to democracy. 
 
Table 1: Bivariate Correlations with Democratic Change: Pearson’s R (N) 
Correlates Entry-Autocracies Entry-Democracies 
Social structure:     
Prosperity (log GDP p.c.) .44* (31) .69*** (28) 
Education: time .61** (27) .67*** (28) 
Education: enrollment .39* (27) .33 (26) 
Tertiarization (serivce sector size) .66*** (29) .53** (28) 
Human Development Index .58** (30) .61** (28) 
Economic resource distribution .45* (31) .75*** (27) 
Income equality: share poorest quintile -.12 (13) .52* (22) 
Income equality: richest to poorest ratio .31 (13) -.2* (22) 
Ethnic polarity -.06 (34) -.6* (28) 
Linguistic fractionalization .04 (33) .05 (28) 
Protestantism .42* (32) .52* (27) 
Western Christianity .65*** (33) .19 (28) 
Islamism -.57 (30) -.4 (28) 
Religious fractionalization -.03 (33) .23 (27) 
State capacity: tax revenue .60* (13) .66*** (25) 
State capacity: government consumption .27 (28) .65*** (26) 
Militarism: soldiers per inhabitants -.24 (31) .19 (27) 
Militarism: governm. expenditure -.50** (27) -.4 (27) 
Political culture:     
Liberty aspirations .73*** (34) .69*** (28) 
Life satisfaction .28 (33) .57** (28) 
Human tolerance (sexuality) .39* (33) .54** (27) 
Human tolerance (ethnicity) -.31 (32) .28 (27) 
Protest behavior .36* (32) .52** (28) 
Interpersonal empathy .11 (31) .64 (16) 
Generalized trust -.12 (34) .73*** (28) 
Social bonds: friendship -.21 (34) .25 (28) 
Institutional confidence: order -.31 (34) .34 (28) 
Institutional confidence: politics -.30 (31) .14 (17) 
Political moderation -.02 (34) .17 (28) 
Political interest .41* (34) -.8 (28) 
Associational activity .04 (31) -.4 (28) 
Religiousness -.10 (33) -.9*** (28) 
International environment:     
Contagion .74*** (34) -.1 (28) 
World system position: log exports p.c. .67*** (32) .76*** (28) 
Significance levels: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .10. 
 
Among the political cultural indicators claimed to be associated with democracy are LIFE 
satisfaction, HUMAN tolerance (in terms of ethnicity and sexual orientation), PROTEST 
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behavior, INTERPERSONAL empathy, GENERALIZED trust, INSTITUTIONAL confidence (to politi-
cal and order institutions), ASSOCIATIONAL activity, SOCIAL bonds, POLITICAL moderation, 
and POLITICAL interest. These indicators reflect cultural modernization, civic culture, social 
capital, or the presence of “democratic personalities” in mass cultures (Almond and Verba 
1963; Putnam 1993). But as we argued, in contrast to liberty aspirations, it is not clear 
whether these attitudes only sustain already existing democracy, whether they themselves 
derive from prior experience with democracy, or whether they actually contribute to con-
verting autocracy into democracy. Another predictor, RELIGIOUSNESS, reflects cultural tra-
ditionalism rather than cultural modernization. This indicator is therefore assumed to be 
negatively associated with democracy. 
The third group of predictors reflects the international environment. Adherents of world 
system theory argue that a society’s position in the global economy determines its chances 
of being democratic: the more central a country’s status in the world economy, the better 
its chances to sustain democracy (Bollen and Jackman 1985). We measure a society’s cen-
trality in the world economy (WORLD system position) by its per capita value of exports. 
Another international variable prominently discussed is diffusion or contagion. Many 
authors argue that democratization waves occur through regional chain reactions, when a 
transition in one country triggers similar changes in neighboring countries. We measure 
CONTAGION by assigning each country the average democratic change in its region.13 
5 Competing Predictors of Democratic Change  
The following tables contain many results worth discussing, but we will focus on our theo-
retical concern, the impact of economic and cultural modernization—in particular, liberty 
aspirations. We will discuss only results that are relevant to this. We find that indicators of 
economic modernization (tertiarization in case of entry-autocracies, economic resource 
distribution in case of entry-democracies) and our indicator of cultural modernization (lib-
erty aspirations for both entry-groups) are among the most significant and strongest corre-
lates of regime change. The next question is whether these findings hold up in multivariate 
regressions. 
Regressing regime change on all of these predictors, raises the problem of many vari-
ables and few cases. Consequently, our predictors must surmount several hurdles to be 
used in the summary models. Our first step was to estimate separate equations for the three 
types of predictors, calculating partial models for socio-structural, political cultural, and 
                                                 
13 A similar measure has been used by Gasiorowski and Power (1998). 
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international effects. This produces six partial models, three for entry-autocracies and three 
for entry-democracies. The partial models are shown in Appendix-Table A1. Second, we 
introduce only those predictors that prove to be significant on the bivariate level (as indi-
cated in Table 1). Ethnic polarization, for example, was not introduced into the socio-
structural model for entry-autocracies, but it has been included for entry-democracies. 
Third, predictors that sharply diminish the number of observations are not used. This ap-
plies to income equality, with entry-autocracies, where the data cover only 13 of 34 cases. 
Fourth, we implement backward deletion in the regression procedure, eliminating the least 
significant predictor in the first step. Elimination is then repeated until only significant 
predictors remain. Predictors that surmount these hurdles, qualify for the summary models. 
The summary models are shown in Table 2. When there is no entry for a given predictor, 
this predictor qualified for the partial model but was eliminated there by the backward de-
letion procedure. A line indicates that the predictor was introduced into the summary 
model but was eliminated here by backward deletion. In all models we calculated the vari-
ance inflation factor of each predictor (labeled VIF) in order to detect multicollinearity. In 
none of the models did these factors exceed a value of 5.0. Our results are therefore not 
contaminated with multicollinearity.14 In addition, we used the DFFITs statistic to identify 
outliers and influential cases. Such unusual cases are identified when the DFFITs statistic 
exceeds a specific value that depends on the number of cases and predictors.15 Instead of 
excluding unusual cases, we implemented “bounded influence estimation” using weights 
for the unusual cases calculated from the DFFITs. In the presence of unusual cases “influ-
ence bounding” is necessary to make OLS-results reliable (see Dietz, Frey, and Kalof 
1987; Moon and Dixon 1992). Although our weighted least squares results hardly differ 
from those of ordinary least squares regression, we report the methodologically preferable 
results from weighted least squares. Unusual cases and their weights are documented in the 
tables. 
The summary models explain less variance in regime change among entry-democracies 
(69%) than among entry-autocracies (93%). This probably reflects the fact that, in an era of 
democratic triumph, democracies faced less serious challenges than autocracies. From our 
theoretical perspective, however, the most important result is that liberty aspirations are the 
only variable surviving all selection procedures for both entry-autocracies and entry-
democracies. Liberty aspirations emerge as the most significant predictor in both types of 
                                                 
14 Variance inflation factors measure collinearity among predictors. Following a common convention, the 
values should remain below 5.0. Otherwise, the magnitudes of coefficients are adulterated (Judge et al. 
1988: 869). The formula for the variance inflation factor is: VIF = 1 / (1 – Rj2). 
15 DFFITs indicate for each observation the scaled change in model fit when this observation is deleted. 
The formula is: DFFITSi = (hi / 1 - hi)½ * ei where hi is the leverage of the i-th observation and ei is its 
studentized residual. The cutting point for classifying cases as unusual is: 2 √ (k + 1) / (n – k – 1) where 
“k” is the number of predictors and “n” the number of observations. See Welsch 1980: 164-167. 
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societies. And as the partial correlations demonstrate, liberty aspirations explain the largest 
amount of the variation in regime change. Again this is true for both entry-autocracies and 
entry-democracies. Controlling for liberty aspirations, the effects of economic moderniza-
tion (which were significant in the partial models) turn out to be insignificant. Economic 
modernization seems to be important only in so far as it contributes to rising liberty-
aspirations. Mass-level liberty aspirations help shape both the transition to democracy in 
autocracies, and the persistence of democratic institutions in already established democra-
cies. 
 
Table 2: Regressing Democratic Change on Structural, Cultural and International 
Predictors: Summary Models 
Entry-Autocracies Entry-Democracies 
Predictors B (SE) part. R VIF B (SE) part. R VIF 
Social structure:         
Tertiarization (serivce sector size) ——— — —     
Economic resource distribution     ——— — — 
Western christianity ——— — —     
Islamism ——— — —     
State capacity: government consump.     ——— — — 
Militarism: governm. expenditure -.54** (.15) -.63 1.48 ——— — — 
Political culture:         
Liberty aspirations 14.07*** (2.09) .84 2.08 6.44** (2.21) .54 1.54 
Generalized trust   
 
 12.39* (6.97) .36 2.09 
Religousness   
 
 -1.23* (.64) -.39 1.94 
Political interest ——— — —     
International environment:         
Contagion .25** (.07) .66 2.04     
World system position: exports p. c. 1.76* (.80) .45 2.76 ——— — — 
Constant -9.51** (3.48)   -16.37* (8.08)   
Multiple R squared (adjusted)   .93    .69  
N   26    28  
 Weighted least squares: weights 
for China (.92), Russia (.16) 
Weighted least squares: weight 
for Portugal (.62) 
No entry: variable not introduced; —— : backwards deletion; *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .10. 
 
These results contradict Przeworski/Limongi’s claim that modernization does not con-
tribute to the emergence of democracy. Similarly, our findings cast serious doubt on both 
Muller/Seligson’s and Inglehart’s findings that mass attitudes have no significant impact 
on shifts toward or away from democracy. Liberty aspirations seem to have been crucial in 
the Third Wave of democratization. 
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6 The Origin of Liberty Aspirations 
We hypothesized that economic modernization is conducive to rising liberty aspirations, 
regardless of whether a society has experienced democracy or autocracy. This assumption 
is crucial in determining whether liberty aspirations lead to democracy, or vice versa. In 
order to prove that liberty aspirations are causally prior to democracy, we must demon-
strate that liberty aspirations are not determined by a society’s prior experience with 
democracy, once we control for economic modernization. 
 
Table 3: Regressing Liberty Aspirations on Prior Democratic Performance and Economic 
Modernization, controlled for Religious Tradition 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Predictors B (SE) partial R VIF B (SE) partial R VIF 
Years of continuous democracy   — — ——— — — 
Democratic performance, 1981-90 ——— — —     
Democratic performance, 1981-85     ——— — — 
Economic resource distribution .02*** (.003) .72 1.31 .02*** (.003) .72 1.31 
Western christianity .01** (.001) .46 1.31 .01** (.001) .46 1.31 
Constant 1.34*** (.09)   1.34*** (.09)   
Multiple R squared (adjusted)   .70    .70  
N   52    52  
 Weighted least squares: weights for Albania (.83), Finland (.85) 
No entry: variable not introduced; ——— : backwards deletion; *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .10. 
 
We test this assumption by regressing liberty aspirations on various indicators of prior 
democratic performance and economic modernization. In addition, we include Western 
cultural heritage as a control predictor. Thus, the regression comprises three different pos-
sible sources of liberty aspirations: economic development, regime experience, and cultural 
tradition. The result in Table 3 is unequivocally clear: controlling for economic moderni-
zation, prior experience with democracy has no significant impact on liberty aspirations; 
while economic modernization has a powerful impact, even controlling for democracy and 
Western cultural heritage. 
Our findings leave little room for an alternative causal interpretation. Several reasons 
invalidate the counter-argument that liberty aspirations are simply the result of democracy. 
We have just demonstrated that prior experience with democracy does not have a signifi-
cant effect on liberty aspirations. Liberty aspirations depend primarily on long-term differ-
ences in economic development. Furthermore, the available evidence indicates that liberty 
aspirations are themselves relatively persistent over time, growing gradually with eco-
nomic development. Persistence alone argues against reverse causation: the sudden regime 
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changes that took place between 1985 and 1995 can not have created differences in liberty 
aspirations that persist over time and were present already earlier. Our findings point to a 
prevailing (though not necessarily exclusive) causal flow from economic development to 
rising liberty aspirations to democratization. 
7 Human Development as the Focus in the Modernization-Democratization 
Nexus 
Statistical evidence of a dominant causal flow does not, by itself, provide theoretical rea-
sons for it. The search for such reasons leads back to the logic of the modernization proc-
ess. Various authors have proposed reasons why economic development and democracy 
are related, or why democracy and civic values, or why civic values and economic devel-
opment, are related. But these reasons are discussed in isolation for each bivariate relation. 
Even the most encompassing studies dissolve the triangular nexus into bivariate relations, 
which are discussed independently of each other.16 Since a theory must be more general 
than the relation it tries to explain, there is no coherent theory of the modernization-democ-
ratization nexus. One of the most central facts of cross-national research still lacks a com-
prehensive interpretation: the fact that economic development, civic culture (in particular 
liberty aspirations), and democracy represent one common syndrome of societal reality. 
This can be demonstrated by various kinds of factor analyses. Regardless of whether we 
use all indicators available for more than 50 cases, or only those that proved significant in 
the summary models, the result is the same (see Table 4): economic development, liberty 
aspirations, and democracy all load on the first principal component and they show the 
strongest loadings on it. They form a robust and distinct dimension in different variants of 
exploratory factor analysis. 
What underlying dimension do these variables reflect? One may easily answer, 
“modernization.” But then we need to give that term a substantive meaning—a meaning 
that specifies each variable’s relationship to this underlying principle. What is the common 
denominator of economic development, liberty aspirations, and democracy? 
We suggest that these variables work together in enhancing individual empowerment. 
Economic development leads to individual empowerment by making more resources avail-
able; liberty aspirations reflect motivational empowerment, giving rise to growing mass 
demands for self-determination; and democracy brings institutional empowerment by 
guaranteeing political rights and civil liberties. These variables converge in the principle of 
                                                 
16 The most comprehensive study of the relationships between economic development, cultural change, 
and democratic institutions is Inglehart and Baker 2000. 
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individual empowerment (see Table 5). We characterize this principle as Human Devel-
opment because increasing individual empowerment contributes to developing a society’s 
inherent human potential. A growing proportion of the people have larger capabilities, 
stronger motivations and wider opportunities to make use of their human talents and 
predilections. Human Development does not necessarily proceed in linear fashion. Instead, 
the three elements of Human Development tend to coincide in either regressing or pro-
gressing, with societies scoring low or high in one of these elements tending to score low 
or high in the other elements as well. 
 
Table 4: The Dimensional Location of the Human Development Components 
 Factor 1: Factor 2: Factor 3: 
 Human 
development 
Ethnic 
division 
Religous 
community 
Economic resource distribution .89 -.22  
Liberty aspirations .87  .17 
Democratic performance, 1995-99 .86  -.14 
Generalized trust .66 -.19 -.28 
Ethnic polarity -.17 .86 .19 
Linguistic fractionalization -.14 .85  
Religousness -.33 .11 .83 
Association activity .19 .20 .76 
Islamism -.44 -.38 .54 
Explained variance 40% 19% 15% 
Entries are factor loadings from principal components analysis with varimax rotation. 
Loadings below .10 suppressed. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure: .62. N = 56. 
 
With this concept of the focal principle in the modernization-nexus, we can revisit the 
causal problem from a more general perspective. The decisive question is whether the logic 
of individual empowerment points to any causal priority in the emergence of its elements. 
In the promotion of individual empowerment, economic development contributes capa-
bilities, liberty aspirations give rise to demands, and democracy provides opportunities 
(maintained by freedom rights). Thus, logic suggests two causal priorities: capabilities give 
rise to demands, and demands give rise to opportunities. 
The first priority is logical because capabilities set the margin for demands that can be 
effectively pursued. It is irrational for people to evolve aspirations for goals that are clearly 
beyond their capabilities. Numerous studies, in widely varying countries, have found that 
people with relatively limited economic and cognitive capabilities place less emphasis on 
political participation.17 People are less likely to aspire to things that are out of reach. Con-
                                                 
17  These are basic findings of the following studies (among others): Inkeles and Smith 1974; Barnes, Kaase 
et. al. 1979; Fuchs and Klingemann 1995; Dalton 1996. 
24 
 
versely, more ambitious demands, such as those connected with postmaterialism, are most 
pronounced among people with greater economic and cognitive capabilities.18 Similarly, 
liberty aspirations tend to be more widespread among people with greater capabilities.19 As 
economic development increases people’s capabilities, it gives rise to higher aspirations. 
Consequently, mass publics in countries with higher levels of economic development show 
stronger liberty aspirations. This corresponds to the logic of individual empowerment: 
capabilities set the parameters for effective demands. 
 
Table 5: The Concept of Human Development 
 The three components of Human Development (HD) 
 Economic component Cultural component Institutional component 
Meaning of the  
HD-components 
Human resources Liberty aspirations Freedom rights 
Spheres in which the  
HD-components emerge 
Socio-economic structure Political culture Regime institutions 
Processes generating the 
HD-components 
Economic development Value change Democratization 
Components’ contribution 
to HD 
Individual empowerment 
through larger capabilities 
Individual empowerment 
through rising demands 
Individual empowerment 
thr. wider opportunities 
Causal priority in the 
emergence of components 
Capabilities Demands Opportunities 
Focal point in which the 
components converge 
Individual empowerment on a mass-level = Human Development of societies 
 
The second priority, that of demands over opportunities, is also logical, since demands set 
the parameters for pressure on given opportunities. In democratic transitions, liberty 
aspirations work as the demand-function (demands for freedom rights), whereas democ-
racy itself serves as the supply-function (supply of freedom rights). If demands are primar-
ily nourished by capabilities, an inadequate level of democracy will not prevent rising 
demands for democracy. For instance, Czechoslovakia had for many decades much lower 
levels of democracy than India, but it nevertheless developed substantially stronger liberty 
aspirations—in accordance with its higher level of economic development. This relation is 
not deterministic. But in so far as there is an empirical connection between liberty aspira-
tions and democratization, it is more plausible to ascribe causal primacy to liberty aspira-
tions: demands for freedom set the parameters for opportunities for freedom. 
                                                 
18  These findings are well documented in Brint 1984; Inglehart 1990; Scarbrough 1995. 
19 In 95 per cent of the national WVS-studies—ranging from Nigeria to China to Sweden—there is a 
highly significant positive relationship between liberty aspirations and levels of income and education. 
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The logic of individual empowerment implies a causal priority of capabilities over 
demands and a priority of demands over opportunities. These priorities reflect a prevailing 
(though not exclusive) causal flow from economic development to liberty aspirations to 
democracy. Positive feed back loops in the reverse direction may well exist, creating a self-
reinforcing cycle of Human Development. But the logic of individual empowerment as 
well as the statistical evidence indicate that the main effects follow the Human Develop-
ment sequence. 
Conclusion 
Our analysis is based on the largest sample of societies ever used to analyze the impact of 
cultural modernization on democratization. This analysis also used, for the first time, a 
change variable based on each nation’s particular timing in its shift toward, or away from, 
democracy over the last 20 years. We focused on a major manifestation of cultural mod-
ernization: mass-level liberty aspirations, a variable previously ignored in empirical studies 
of regime transitions. 
Our attention was drawn to the role of liberty aspirations by the concept of Human 
Development, which moves beyond standard modernization theory. Usually, theoretical 
concepts cannot maximize comprehensiveness and specificness at the same time. But the 
concept of Human Development does. On one hand, Human Development is a comprehen-
sive concept that integrates changes in three distinct spheres of society: socio-economic 
structures, political culture, and regime institutions. On the other hand, the concept is spe-
cific because it integrates the changes in these spheres into one theme: individual empow-
erment. Finally and foremost, the principle of individual empowerment entails a more 
general logic that implies causal priorities in the emergence of economic development, 
liberty aspirations, and democracy (one that is supported by statistical evidence). 
Our analysis is unusual in that we relate change-rates in one variable to level-differences 
in another. Doing so, we demonstrated a statistical relation between a variable that is rela-
tively stable (cultural modernization) and another variable that can change suddenly 
(democracy). Logically, there is only one causal interpretation for this type of relation. 
Sudden changes cannot cause long-term level-differences that already existed earlier. 
Level-differences, however, can produce varying change-rates if a third effect (such as a 
shift in international regime support) removes a “gate-blocker” that prevented level-differ-
ences from bringing corresponding changes. In this way, one can explain rates of regime 
change from levels of modernization. We did not analyze when democratic transitions 
occur. We took the occurrence of democratic transitions as a given and attempted to pre-
26 
 
dict their range. Any explanation of the occurrence of transition waves must take 
international regime support into account. But once transitions occur, any explanation of 
their ranges should recognize modernization factors, especially liberty aspirations. 
We did not analyze the mechanisms how mass-level liberty aspirations translate into 
groupings and actions that bring about regime change. But such mechanisms must exist. 
Otherwise mass-level liberty aspirations would have no significant effect on subsequent 
regime changes. Actually, this effect is profound and can not be simply ruled out. This 
shifts the burden of proof to those who believe that regime changes are unaffected by pre-
vailing mass preferences and simply a matter of voluntary elite action.20 
We lack sufficient longitudinal data to provide a final proof, but available statistical evi-
dence, plus theoretical reasons, point to a primary causal flow from liberty aspirations to 
democracy. This finding contradicts the claim that mass attitudes are insignificant for the 
emergence of modern democracies. Many scholars have been trying to identify the mass 
attitudes that are most conducive to democracy, but none of them explicitly pointed to lib-
erty aspirations. Adherents of the actors-approach accept that the consolidation of democ-
racy is somehow linked with development, but they still believe that change toward 
democracy depends on voluntary elite action. The fact that mass liberty aspirations 
explains 65 to 93 per cent of the variance in our model, indicates that elites are only part of 
the story. The residual in our models probably reflects the leeway that collective actors 
have in steering democratic change; but this residual is relatively small, though not negli-
gible. Hence, the leverage of collective actors seems to involve mainly when and how they 
can bring democratic change, rather than how far it will go. 
                                                 
20 There are two possibilities how mass-level liberty aspirations translate into democratization. One is that 
liberty aspirations determine the strength of popular movements for democracy. The other one is that 
they determine the strength of liberal reformers among the elites. To refuse the latter would imply that 
elites are unaffected by a society’s prevailing values and attitudes, which is inherently implausible. 
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Appendix 
The following sections describe our variables and data sources. 
Prosperity: logged per capita GDP in US-Dollar at market exchange rates in 1990, 
United Nations Statistical Yearbook 1994. Education: time: years which people of at least 
25 years spent in full-time education in 1990, Human Development Report 1991. 
Education: enrollment: number of students per 100,000 inhabitants in 1990, UNESCO-
Statistical Yearbook 1994. Tertiarization: per cent labor force in service sector in 1990, 
Human Development Report 1997. Human development index: measures for 1994, 
Human Development Report 1997. The index combines life expectancy, per capita GDP 
and literacy rates. Economic resource distribution: measures for 1988, partly 1993. Index 
combines three subindices, including (1) an index of physical resources, generated from 
the share of family farms in the agricultural sector and the deconcentration of non-
agricultural resources (100 minus the share in GDP generated by the state, foreign 
enterprises and large national trusts); (2) an index of cognitive resources, measured by the 
number of students per 100,000 inhabitants and the literacy rate; (3) an index of 
occupational diversification, calculated from the proportion of the urban population and the 
percentage of the non-agricultural work force (description of sources and scaling in 
Vanhanen 1997: 42-63). Income equality: share poorest quintile: share in GDP of the 
poorest 20% of households between 1981 and 1993, Human Development Report 1996. 
Income equality: poorest to richest ratio: ratio of poorest to richest quintile, same 
source. Ethnic polarity: percentage of the second largest ethnic group around the mid 
1980s, from 1990 and 1993 Britannica Book of the Year. Linguistic fractionalization: 
Rae-index of fractionalization calculated from the number and proportion of language 
groups, Britannica Book of the Year 1998. Protestantism: percentage protestants ca. mid 
1980s, same source as for ethnic polarity. Western Cultural heritage: percentage 
Protestants plus Catholics ca. mid 1980s, same source. Islamism: percentage Muslims ca. 
mid 1980s, same source. Religious fractionalization: Rae-index of fractionalization 
calculated from the number and proportion of religious groups, Britannica Book of the 
Year 1998. State capacity: tax revenue: share of the state’s tax revenue in GDP as of 
1989-90, Human Development Report 1992. State capacity: government consumption: 
government consumption in per capita US-$ 1994, Human Development Report 1998. 
Militarism: soldiers per inhabitants: soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants, 1998 Britannica 
Book of the Year. Militarism: government expenditure: per cent military expenditure in 
total government expenditure 1995, same source. Years of continuous democracy: 
counted from the first complete year in national independence till 1985, except post-Soviet 
and post-Yugoslav states that obtained the values of the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia. Years 
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were counted as democratic when a country scored on at least 8 points on the 10-point 
democracy scale of Gurr and Jaggers, “Polity III” data (Jaggers and Gurr 1995, ICPSR 
#6695). Contagion: each country scores at the average regime change of its region from 
1985 to 1995. Regional averages were calculated for all countries scored by Freedom 
House. Regions defined due to Inglehart’s concept of “cultural zones” (Inglehart and Baker 
2000). World system position: logged US-$ of exports per capita 1994, Human 
Development Report 1998. 
The following variables are taken from the second and third World Values Surveys. Life 
satisfaction: national average on a 10-point rating scale for life satisfaction (v96). 
*Human tolerance: sexuality: “not mentioned” for “disliked neighbors” selected and 
dichotomized as 1 against 0; scores added for neighbors with AIDS (v58) and homosexual 
neighbors (v60); aggregate measure is a national average on a 0-2 scale. *Human 
tolerance: ethnicity: scores added for neighbors of different nationality (v52), different 
religion (v57) and immigrants (v58). *Protest behavior: “already done” for 
“participation” dichotomized; scores for petition (v118), boycott (v119), and 
demonstration (v120) added; aggregate measure is an average on a 0-3 scale. 
Interpersonal empathy: percentage of people opting for “understand others’ preferences” 
when asked what is “important for human relations” (v48). Generalized trust: percentage 
of respondents believing “most people can be trusted” (v27). Social bonds: “very 
important” dichotomized for “importance of family” (v4) and “importance of friends” (v5); 
scores added to a 0-2 scale. *Institutional confidence: order: “very” and “quite” 
confident dichotomized; scores for church (v135), army (v136), police (v141) and legal 
system (v137) added to a 0-4 scale. *Institutional confidence: politics: scores for 
parliament (v144), government (v142), parties (v143), and civil service (v145) added to 0-
4 scale. Political moderation: percentage of respondents opting for “gradual reforms” 
when asked for their preferred mode of societal change (v124). Political interest: 
percentage of respondents who report to “discuss politics” “frequently” with friends (v37). 
*Associational activity: “active membership” dichotomized; scores added for religious 
associations (v28), education, arts and music associations (v30), environmental 
associations (v33), and charitable associations (v35). Religiousness: “importance of god in 
one’s life,” national average on a 10-point scale (1: not at all important, 10:very 
important). 
*Items that are summarized in additive indices form a distinct principal component in 
exploratory factor analyses of the related item batteries, using the pooled individual data. 
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Table A1: Regressing Democratic Change on Structural, Cultural and International 
Predictors: (Partial Models) 
 Entry-Autocracies Entry-Democracies 
Predictors B (SE) part. R VIF B (SE) part. R VIF 
Social structure:         
Prosperity (log GDP p.c.)     ——— — — 
Education: time ——— — — ——— — — 
Tertiarization (serivce sector size) .20*** (.05) .75 1.45     
Economic resource distribution     .22** (.08) .50 1.68 
Ethnic polarity     ——— — — 
Protestantism     ——— — — 
Western Christianity .12** (.03) .68 1.41     
Islamism -.08* (.04) -.41 1.47     
State capacity: tax revenue     ——— — — 
State capacity: governm. consumption     .49* (.23) .44 1.68 
Militarism: governm. expenditure -.43* (.20) -.47 1.29 ——— — — 
Constant 21.78*** (2.69)   -20.12*** (3.28)   
Multiple R squared (adjusted)   .85    .57  
N   23    25  
 Weighted least squares: weights 
for Azerbaijan (.45), Bangladesh 
(.53), China (.69) 
Weighted least squares: weights 
for Brazil (.64), Finland (.69), 
Portugal (.71) 
Political culture:         
Liberty aspirations 14.45*** (3.64) .62 1.18 5.68** (1.20) .46 1.52 
Life satisfaction     ——— — — 
Human tolerance (sexuality) ——— — — ——— — — 
Protest behavior ——— — — ——— — — 
Generalized trust     14.88* (6.78) .41 1.93 
Political interest 27.14* (13.49) .39 1.18     
Religousness     -1.15* (.61) -.37 1.81 
Constant -6.79 (5.85)   -15.76* (8.06)   
Multiple R squared (adjusted)   .52    .66  
N   34    28  
 Weighted least squares: weights 
for Belarus (.69), China (.67) 
Weighted least squares: weights for 
Finland (.80), Portugal (.75) 
International environment:         
Contagion .49*** (.12) .61 1.37 ——— — — 
World system position: exports p. c. 3.67** (1.20) .49 1.37 3.89*** (.52) .83 1.00 
Constant -7.81 (6.37)   -35.35*** (4.26)   
Multiple R squared (adjusted)   .63    .66  
N   32    28  
 Weighted least squares: weights 
for Nigeria (.67), Uruguay (.76) 
Weighted least squares: weights 
for Finland (.27), India (.24), 
Venezuela (.61) 
No entry: variable not introduced; ——— : backwards deletion; *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .10. 
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